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Introduction  
Throughout the last decades various European countries have witnessed an increase in 
the electoral support for populist parties. There has been substantial scholarly attention 
for the performance of these parties, mostly focusing on radical right-wing variants in 
Western Europe. The role of these parties themselves in shaping their electoral fortune 
has been somewhat understudied, however. This article does consider the populist 
parties’ agency as one of the vital factors in explaining for the electoral performance of 
populist parties. Other crucial variables it indentifies are the availability of the electorate 
and the responsiveness of established parties. The importance of these explanatory 
conditions is illustrated by means of a study of populist parties in the Netherlands.       
In the Netherlands, two populist parties have managed to obtain a considerable 
share of the vote in recent elections. After the rise of Pim Fortuyn in 2002 and the 
subsequent decline of his party, Dutch party politics has been rocked again by the 
Freedom Party of Geert Wilders. This party became the third largest party in Dutch 
parliament after the general election of June 2010. Yet, various other populist parties 
have made less successful attempts in general elections. The Netherlands thus lends 
itself as a case in which successful and unsuccessful manifestations of populism can be 
compared, providing an ideal ‘laboratory’ environment for learning about the electoral 
performance of populist parties in general. Thus, while the characteristics of the Dutch 
populist parties are in some ways unique, the findings of this contribution are likely to 
also have wider implications with regard to the electoral performance of populist parties 
in other countries.  
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This article claims that a combination of explanatory conditions is crucial in 
understanding populist electoral fortune and hardship. Accordingly, this contribution will 
argue that the electoral success of the Dutch populist parties has been facilitated by the 
availability of the Dutch electorate, which became increasingly detached from traditional 
political parties. To understand the actual breakthrough of populist parties and their 
subsequent success or failure to survive, however, the agency of political actors must be 
considered. This relates, in the first place, to the responsiveness of established political 
parties. As will be shown, by the turn of the 21st century neither of the mainstream 
parties sufficiently responded to the electorate’s concerns related to immigration and 
cultural integration of, most notably, the Muslim minority population. This provided a 
favourable opportunity structure for the Dutch populist anti-establishment parties that 
focused on these issues. Secondly, as noted above, the credibility of the populist parties 
themselves has proven to be crucial to their breakthrough and electoral persistence. This 
relates to the skill of the populist party leadership and the ability to build up a sound 
party organisation after the initial breakthrough.                
 The following section touches on the concept of populism and the way populist 
parties are defined in this contribution. The subsequent section introduces the theoretical 
framework. Afterwards, the Dutch political background, the electoral developments and 
the characteristics of the most notable populist parties - the List Pim Fortuyn and the 
Freedom Party – are discussed. The remainder of the article focuses on explaining the 
electoral performance of populist parties in the Netherlands.    
 
Populist parties  
The concept of ‘populism’ is ambiguous due to the fact that it is often ill-defined and 
used in a haphazard fashion (see Taggart & Van Kessel, 2009; Van Kessel et al., 2008). 
Although it goes beyond the scope of this contribution to do the conceptual debate 
justice, it is necessary to provide a definition of populism in order to clarify the selection 
of populist cases in this article. Political parties are here classified as populist parties if 
they (1) delineate an exclusive community of ‘ordinary people’, (2) appeal to these 
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‘ordinary’ people, whose interests and opinions should be central in making political 
decisions, (3) are fundamentally hostile towards the (political) establishment, which 
allegedly does not act in the interest of the ordinary people (see e.g. Canovan, 1981; 
Taggart, 2000; Mudde, 2004; Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008).  
Populist parties thus position the ‘ordinary people’ and ‘the establishment’ in an 
antagonistic relationship. It is obviously not self-evident who belongs to these ‘ordinary 
people’ and populists are often not very specific about their core target audience. 
Instead, this community of ‘ordinary people’, the populist ‘heartland’ in the words of Paul 
Taggart (2000), is often rhetorically constructed in a negative manner. Populists normally 
identify those people that do not belong to the community (see Mudde, 2007; Albertazzi 
& McDonnell, 2008). Immigrants and minority groups are usual suspects, although 
populists are not necessarily xenophobic. The group of ‘others’ could, for instance, also 
consist of corporate elites, the media or intelligentsia whose ideas, values and interests 
are at odds with those of the ordinary people. 
 Populists are in any case opposed to the political powers that be. Residing in their 
ivory towers, the members of the political establishment lost track of the everyday 
problems of the people. The critique of populist parties goes further than condemning a 
particular political party or government - all (opposition) parties do that from time to 
time. Populists criticise the whole established political system and those parties that are 
seen to be part of it. A new way of decision-making is required, one that is 
straightforward, transparent and effectively copes with the people’s problems. 
A final note is that populist parties do not necessarily intend to get their following 
directly involved in politics. Instead, the populist party or, more specifically, the populist 
leader claims to speak in the name of the people; the populist knows what the ordinary 
people want and truly represents their interests. 
On the basis of this definition, the populist parties in the Netherlands will be 
identified. This article particularly focuses on the List Pim Fortuyn and Geert Wilders’ 
Freedom Party, the populist parties that made most of an impact. In the analysis dealing 
with the electoral performance of populist parties, however, also the less successful 
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populists will be discussed. The next section firstly outlines the theoretical framework for 
this analysis.           
 
  
Explaining the electoral performance of populist parties 
The central question in this contribution is how the electoral performance of populist 
parties can be explained. Various studies have tried to account for the performance of 
non-mainstream ‘challenger’ parties, especially extreme/radical right or anti-immigrant 
parties (e.g. Kitschelt & McGann, 1995; Lubbers et al., 2002; Carter, 2005; Van der Brug 
et al., 2005; Norris, 2005). Several other accounts deal with the performance of populist 
parties (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008) and populist radical-right parties in particular 
(Betz, 1994; Rydgren, 2004; Mudde, 2007; Bornschier, 2010) Amir Abedi (2004) 
broadened the scope by studying the performance of ‘Anti-Political Establishment’ parties 
more generally. These studies regularly focus on structural factors, like economic 
conditions, the electoral system and other institutional rules, but do not always yield 
similar results (see e.g. Jackman & Volpert, 1996; Carter, 2005; Arzheimer & Carter, 
2006). Also the ideological placement of mainstream parties and their rivals and the 
convergence of mainstream parties have been taken into consideration in order to 
account for new non-mainstream party performance.          
      This study cannot truly take institutional factors into account, as it focuses on a 
single country. Besides, in view of the varying performance of populist parties in the 
Netherlands throughout the years, the marked proportionality of the Dutch electoral 
system is certainly not a sufficient condition for populist electoral success. Also economic 
conditions, as will be shown below, did not account for the breakthrough of populist 
parties at the beginning of the 21st century. Finally, instead of measuring party distances 
in a one- or multi-dimensional ideological space, this article focuses on the 
responsiveness of established parties with regard to specific societal issues. Determining 
party positions or assessing the distance between parties mainly relates to the political 
supply-side. This study starts off from the notion that the responsiveness of established 
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parties to the voters’ demands - relating to both demand- and supply-side - plays a 
more crucial role in explaining populist electoral performance.       
 A more structural factor to be considered firstly, however, is the availability of the 
electorate (see Bartolini & Mair, 1990; Bartolini, 1999). This relates to the voters’ ties 
with established parties; is the electorate marked by strong partisan commitments or are 
many voters 'available' to be swayed by newly established parties? Abedi (2010) indeed 
finds that weak party partisan attachment is conducive to the success of anti-political 
establishment parties.                
The two other factors this study distinguishes are related to the agency of 
political parties. Firstly, as mentioned, the responsiveness of established political parties 
is likely to play a significant role (Hauss & Rayside, 1978: 38). If established parties do 
not recognise the salience of particular issues within society or if they fail to represent a 
dominant position with regard to those, they are potentially vulnerable to the rise of new 
challengers. Especially populist parties, which fundamentally criticise the political 
establishment, are likely to thrive when established political parties are perceived to be 
unresponsive to the demands of the ‘ordinary citizens’. Apart from more substantive 
policy-related motivations, a vote for a populist party typically is an expression of 
dissatisfaction with the political establishment (see Bélanger & Aarts, 2006). Existing 
parties, however, may hamper the development of populist parties by successfully 
seizing the ownership of the issues addressed by the populists (see Bale, 2003; Meguid, 
2008). 
Finally, even if the breeding ground for populism is present, there would be no 
populist success without the supply of a credible populist political party. The importance 
of party organisation and leadership for explaining new (populist) party success has been 
acknowledged (e.g. Betz 1998: 9; Albertazzi & McDonnell 2008). As Cas Mudde (2007: 
275) notes with regard to the populist radical right, only few theoretical frameworks, 
however, take into account the agency of these parties themselves. In her comparative 
analysis dealing with Western European extreme right parties Elisabeth Carter (2005) 
does consider these parties’ agency. She finds that especially the strength of the party 
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organisation and the skill of the party leadership are important in terms of these parties’ 
electoral performance (see also Lubbers et al., 2002). This is very likely to apply to 
populist parties as well; populist parties have to present themselves as viable 
alternatives to the established parties in order to become successful. Particularly with 
regard to populist parties, the appearance of the party leader plays a crucial role. 
Populist parties tend to be hierarchical organisations, spearheaded by a dominant and 
strong leader.        
Measuring the credibility of populist parties is not an easy task, however. A 
qualitative assessment seems the best way to proceed when dealing with this variable. 
Another challenge is not to fall in a tautology trap; it is easy enough to ascertain that 
successful populist parties must have presented themselves as credible challengers. 
Therefore, it is necessary to look at indictors of credibility before the elections actually 
took place.  
In terms of party leadership skills, this account assesses whether the populist 
parties have managed to attract sufficient media attention and whether the party 
(leader) made a strong impression during the election campaign. Also the credibility of 
the populist anti-establishment message is considered. It can be difficult for populist 
parties to convincingly stick to their anti-establishment appeal once they take place in 
government, as they have to become part of the system they previously vehemently 
opposed (Taggart, 2000). 
In line with Mudde’s (2007: 275-6) assertion, leadership seems particularly 
important with regard to the breakthrough of populist parties, whereas the electoral 
persistence of the parties relies very much on their party organisation. After their 
breakthrough, populist parties are likely to lose their credibility if they fail to preserve 
internal discipline and cohesion (Norris 2005: 263). As mentioned above, since populist 
parties are generally leader-centred organisations, they are especially likely to fall apart 
when the leader departs or loses grip on the party. The lack of a developed grass-root 
organisation, supplying fitting and reliable personnel for political office, is also conducive 
to internal instability.        
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This article thus identifies three factors which are deemed crucial to explain the 
electoral performance of populist parties: availability of the electorate, responsiveness of 
the established parties and the availability of credible populist parties. Arguably, similar 
variables can be identified to study the electoral performance of new ‘challenger’ parties 
more generally. This account, however, focuses on the elements relevant to populist 
parties in particular, such as the leader-centeredness and the populist anti-establishment 
appeal.   
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the causal conditions outlined above are not 
entirely unrelated. A lack of established parties’ responsiveness, for instance, may 
increase the availability of an electorate which has become disillusioned with its political 
elite. For analytical purposes, however, it makes sense to separate the variables. 
Moreover, whereas many scholars focus on individual variables in explaining the electoral 
success of (populist) political parties, this paper argues that it is the combination of 
explanatory conditions that is crucial in understanding populist electoral fortune. 
Independence of the variables outlined here is thus not so much a vital matter.  
         
Populist parties in the Netherlands1  
During the 20th century populist parties have sporadically appeared in the Dutch party 
system, although they never became successful for an extended period of time. The 
Farmer’s Party (Boerenpartij) broke through in the 1960s, but would never receive more 
than 4.8% of the vote. Also the ethno-nationalist xenophobic parties led by Hans 
Janmaat in the 1980s and 1990s (the Centre Party and  Centre Democrats), could only 
count on limited and short-lived electoral success.  Another populist party that emerged 
was the left-wing Socialist Party (SP). In the 1990s the party with Maoist roots could be 
described as a ‘social-populist’ party (March & Mudde, 2005). However, in more recent 
years the party got, to a considerable degree, rid of its populist rhetoric and turned into 
a more conventional social-democratic party (De Lange & Rooduijn, 2011; Voerman & 
Lucardie, 2007). This process had started before the general election of 2002, when the 
party grew and collected just under 6% of the vote, and was more or less completed 
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when the SP reached its high point in 2006 with over 16% of the vote. The party’s real 
breakthrough was thus not so much driven by its populism.  
It was only after the turn of the 21st century that a whole array of populist parties 
appeared on the Dutch political scene. Therefore, although the credibility of the SP and 
Janmaat’s parties will be discussed later, this contribution predominantly focuses on the 
electoral performances of populist parties since the rise of Pim Fortuyn.   
   
The rise and fall of the List Pim Fortuyn 
The recent electoral success of Geert Wilders’ Freedom Party (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 
PVV) can hardly be seen independent from the previous rise of another populist politician 
in 2002: Pim Fortuyn. Fortuyn mainly reacted against the two ‘Purple’ coalition 
governments that had been formed in 1994 and 1998. These coalitions consisted of the 
‘red’ Labour Party (Partij van de Arbeid, PvdA), the ‘blue’ Liberals (Volkspartij voor 
Vrijheid en Democratie, VVD) and the smaller progressive Liberal D66 (Democraten 66). 
During this period, the Christian Democrats, since 1980s united in the Christian 
Democratic Appeal (Christen Democratisch Appel, CDA), were excluded from government 
for the first time since 1918.         
Fortuyn, a columnist and former sociology professor, founded his party List Pim 
Fortuyn (Lijst Pim Fortuyn, LPF) after he was expelled from the also newly formed party 
‘Liveable Netherlands’ (Leefbaar Nederland, LN). After his dismissal Fortuyn could 
immediately count on a substantial amount of support in the pre-election polls. 
According to the criteria outlined above, the List Pim Fortuyn was a populist party. 
Fortuyn appealed to the ‘ordinary people’, although he did not always explicitly describe 
his projected following as such. Still, his populist appeal can be noted in his book annex 
political programme ‘The shambles of eight years Purple’: “The Netherlands should 
become a real lively democracy of and for the ordinary people, and depart from the elite 
party democracy we are currently acquainted with” (Fortuyn, 2002, pp. 186). What is 
more, according to Fortuyn, power would have to be returned to the ‘people in the 
country’ (Lucardie, 2008); the number of managers and bureaucrats had to be reduced 
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and responsibility would have to be returned to the ‘real’ experts: the nurses, teachers 
and police officers (LPF, 2002). Besides, as is clear from the examples above, Fortuyn 
expressed harsh critique on the political establishment, the incumbent ‘Purple’ 
government in particular. In the official election manifesto it is argued that ‘Purple’ has 
left the Netherlands with a rigid and self-satisfied political culture of appointed 
executives lacking creative or learning capacities (LPF, 2002, pp. 1).  
Apart from the party’s populist features, the LPF’s more substantive political 
programme was rather eclectic (Lucardie, 2008); Fortuyn generally promoted a free-
market economy, tough measures with regard to law and order issues and stressed the 
need to cut red tape in the healthcare and education sectors. At the same time, however, 
his position on moral or cultural issues like drugs and traditional marriage was very 
liberal.  
Yet it was in his stance on immigration and integration that Fortuyn attracted 
most controversy. According to the LPF manifesto, crowdedness in The Netherlands 
caused growing societal tensions and it was therefore necessary to resist immigration of 
more, often unemployed and unskilled, foreigners into the country (LPF, 2002, pp. 5). 
The programme also speaks of problems caused by the social-cultural backwardness of 
large groups in society and related problems like criminality and discrimination of 
women, especially in fundamentalist Islamic circles. Fortuyn sought to protect the Dutch 
liberal way of life against foreign cultural influences that clashed with the Dutch or, more 
broadly, Western liberal Enlightenment values (Akkerman, 2005). His ideology was at 
odds with the idea of a diverse multicultural society in which liberal principles came 
under pressure.  
Fortuyn would not witness the results of the general elections; on May 6 he was 
murdered by an environmental activist. The campaign was officially cancelled, but the 
elections were not, and despite the dramatic incident the remaining List Pim Fortuyn 
members decided to participate. On the 15th of May the LPF won 17.0% of the vote and 
26 of the 150 seats in the Dutch parliament (see table 1). This was an unprecedented 
result for a new party; the former 'record' for a newcomer being 8 seats for DS'70 in 
10 
 
1971. At the same time, the Purple coalition partners suffered an enormous defeat. The 
LPF would join a coalition government with the Christian Democrats and the Liberals. 
However, it proved to be the shortest incumbent government in Dutch history; after 87 
days the coalition partners CDA and VVD brought it down after a period of severe LPF 
infighting.                
A new general election was scheduled for January  2003. Under the leadership of 
former Fortuyn spokesman Mat Herben, the LPF lost most its previous support, gaining 
5.7% of the vote and 8 seats. On first sight the results of the 2003 general elections 
seemed to indicate a return to ‘old’ politics; the established parties recovered quite well 
from their electoral blow in 2002. Also, no new parties managed to enter parliament.  
 
*** TABLE 1 HERE *** 
 
The rise of Geert Wilders  
The subsequent general election of 2006 saw the return of a populist party. The Freedom 
Party of Geert Wilders received 5.9% of the vote and nine seats. Wilders was a former 
MP for the Liberal Party (VVD) who broke with his party in September 2004 after a 
conflict with the parliamentary leader over the issue of Turkish EU membership. Wilders 
refused to give up his seat in Parliament and formed his own one-man fraction ‘Group 
Wilders’, or Freedom Party as he later named it. 
In terms of populism, Wilders appeals to the ‘ordinary people’ even more 
explicitly and criticises the established political elite more harshly than Fortuyn used to 
do. Wilders (2005, pp. 1) speaks of a “range of interlinked crises which flow from the 
incompetence of the political elite in Brussels and The Hague”. In his ‘declaration of 
independence’ Wilders (2005, pp. 2) further states: “I do not want this country to be 
hijacked by an elite of cowardly and frightened people (from whichever party) any 
longer. (…) Therefore, I intend to challenge this elite on all fronts. I want to return this 
country to its citizens”. Wilders despises the self-sustaining political system which stands 
isolated from society; “politicians should no longer be deaf to the problems troubling 
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ordinary people in every-day life” (Wilders, 2005, pp. 16).     
In terms of substantive policies, Wilders’ initial appeal was similar to Fortuyn’s, 
but more radical as regards immigration and integration.  Islam is perceived as a violent 
‘ideology’ and Dutch culture should be protected against the process of ‘Islamisation’ 
(Vossen 2010). The manifesto of 2010 nevertheless argues that the PVV is not a one-
issue party, as Islamisation touches on a range of other social issues: “Economically it is 
a disaster, it damages the quality of our education, it increases insecurity on the streets, 
causes an exodus out of our cities, drives out Jewish and gay people, and flushes the 
century-long emancipation of women down the toilet” (PVV, 2010, pp. 6).  
Finally, although Wilders predominantly agitates against the ‘left-wing’ elites and 
their expensive ‘left-wing hobbies’ like foreign aid and art, the social-economic 
programme of the PVV in 2010 was eclectic and included various left-wing measures. 
Wilders had always been against raising the pension age, but before generally favoured a 
small state and a flexible labour market (Wilders, 2005; PVV, 2006). In 2010, however, 
the PVV called for the preservation of the welfare state and was against easing the rules 
for laying off employees, amending unemployment benefits and more marketisation in 
the health care sector. Nevertheless, the PVV was at the same time against abolishing 
the mortgage interest relief and in favour of tax cuts and deregulation for business 
entrepreneurs.  
The general election results of June 2010 showed that Geert Wilders had 
managed to extend his support base significantly. With 15.5% of the vote and 24 seats 
Wilders came close to the amount of support the List Fortuyn gathered in 2002. The 
Freedom Party became the third largest party in parliament. Another ex-Liberal politician 
voicing populist rhetoric, Rita Verdonk with her movement ‘Proud of the Netherlands’ 
(Trots op Nederland, TON), failed to cross the electoral threshold.  
Wilders eventually signed an agreement to support the minority coalition between 
the Liberals and the Christian Democrats. This Cabinet was officially installed in October 
2010. Although the Netherlands has a long tradition of majority governments, the 
election outcome thus resulted in a construction similar to the Danish case. Here, the 
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populist anti-immigrant People’s Party has supported minority coalitions since 2001.  
 How can the electoral performances of the List Pim Fortuyn and the Freedom 
Party, as well as the less successful populist parties, be explained? The remainder of this 
paper will deal with this question, setting off from the theoretical framework outlined 
earlier.  
 
Explaining the rise (and fall) of populist parties in contemporary Dutch 
politics  
 
The availability of the electorate 
The first condition conducive to the recent breakthrough of populist parties in the 
Netherlands relates to the availability of the electorate,  which has changed considerably 
throughout the past decades. The electorate was relatively unavailable in the decades 
after the Second World War due to the ‘pillarised’ structure of Dutch society. This meant 
that the major Dutch parties and the most significant religious and social groups, or 
‘pillars’, were closely aligned (Lijphart, 1975). Thus, the electorate largely voted along 
the cleavage lines of religion and social class, being represented by either the Christian 
Democratic Parties, the Labour Party, representing the working class, or the Liberal 
Party, representing the secular middle class (e.g. Van Holsteyn & Irwin, 2003; Andeweg 
& Irwin, 2002).  
 
*** TABLE 2 HERE *** 
 
The dividing lines between pillars gradually evaporated, however, largely due to 
the secularisation of society since the 1960s. People’s sociological background still 
predicted voting behaviour quite well in the following decades, especially with regard to 
the religious pillars (see table 2) (Van Holsteyn & Irwin, 2003). By the turn of the 21st 
century, however, the explanatory power of this factor had become very low. As table 2 
shows, the ‘structural model’ based on these traditional cleavages explained 72% of the 
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total vote in 1956. This percentage gradually declined and in 2002 only 28% of the vote 
could still be explained by this model. Hence, due to the declining partisan alignments 
the availability of the voters in the Netherlands gradually increased and, at present, 
voters’ sociological background hardly predicts voting behaviour anymore. In other 
words, “the closed political and electoral system opened up, the ‘pillars’ of Dutch society 
began to crumble, and voters finally began to choose” (Van Holsteyn & Irwin, 2003, pp. 
48). 
The increased availability of the electorate becomes apparent if one looks at the 
aggregate levels of electoral volatility; the voteshare that shifts from one party to 
another between elections. If ties between parties and their traditional support bases 
have weakened one would expect voters to switch between parties to a greater extent. 
Indeed, as figure 1 shows, electoral volatility in the Netherlands has taken a vast flight 
from the elections in 1989 onwards. The most recent volatility figures are even the 
highest in Western Europe (Mair, 2008).  
 
*** FIGURE 1 HERE *** 
 
The increased availability of the Dutch electorate had serious consequences for 
the fortunes of small and newly formed parties. These previously used to remain 
marginal in terms of size and influence,  if they managed to enter the Dutch parliament 
at all (Krouwel & Lucardie, 2008; Van Kessel & Krouwel, 2011). These consequences 
were particularly serious in view of the highly proportional Dutch electoral system which 
has, in theory, always been very open to new political parties (Mair, 2008).  
In order to account for the electoral performance of populist parties, however, 
also the agency of political parties has to be considered.  
 
Responsiveness of the established parties 
Before the rise of Fortuyn, some scholars already predicted the potential for populist 
parties in The Netherlands. Rudy Andeweg (2001, pp. 123), for instance, argued that the 
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Dutch consensus democracy would provide fertile grounds for critique from the populist 
right, as consensus democracies are “strong on inclusiveness and weak on 
accountability”. Also Jacques Thomassen (2000) predicted that there was potential for 
the populist radical right, although he related it more specifically to the convergence of 
the mainstream parties towards the political centre.  
The findings of Pennings and Keman (2003), based on data from the Comparative 
Manifestos Project, indeed confirm that the mainstream parties in the Netherlands have 
converged. The authors also see this as one of the main factors behind Fortuyn’s 
success. The public was not able to distinguish between mainstream parties anymore, 
and Fortuyn was able to occupy the political space that has become vacant. 
Figure 2 depicts the traditional mainstream parties’ position on the specific issue 
of multiculturalism - one of the issues Fortuyn attracted most attention with - since 
1981. The figure indicates whether the parties, on balance, made more positive or 
negative comments about multiculturalism, including matters such as cultural integration 
and preservation of cultural and religious heritage (see Budge et al., 2001; Klingemann 
et al., 2006). The graph shows that in the 1980s the three parties did not perceive 
multiculturalism as a negative phenomenon. In the 1990s only the Liberals were critical 
of multiculturalism. During these years, Liberal leader Bolkestein indeed voiced concern 
that a lack of integration of minority groups would threaten (secular) Western liberal 
achievements (Prins, 2002).  
 
*** FIGURE 2 HERE *** 
 
By 2002, however, the Liberals had stopped pressing the issue of multiculturalism 
and little was separating the three mainstream parties on this issue. This gave Fortuyn 
the room to position himself as the main critic of multicultural society. In 2003, 
according to the data, the Labour Party and the Liberals had shifted their positions 
towards multiculturalism dramatically (see also Oosterwaal & Torenvlied, 2010).  
Interestingly, however, neither of these parties have succeeded in (re)gaining full 
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‘ownership’ of this issue, in view of the more recent electoral success of Geert Wilders’ 
Freedom Party.  
Be that as it may, the fact that the mainstream parties did not press certain 
issues or the fact that party programmes have converged throughout time does not 
necessarily mean that parties have also been unresponsive. Perhaps the issue of 
multiculturalism was not perceived to be very important by the Dutch electorate.  This, 
however, was certainly not the case. As Pellikaan, De Lange and Van der Meer (2003; 
2007) argue, the established parties failed to recognise that citizens actually were 
concerned about the perceived problems of immigration and the 'multicultural' character 
of society. Fortuyn managed to introduce a new ‘cultural’ line of political conflict which 
“had been ignored by the political elite, but was highly salient to the electorate” 
(Pellikaan et al., 2007, pp. 294). 
On the basis of Dutch Parliamentary Election studies Kees Aarts and Jacques 
Thomassen (2008, pp. 217) indeed find that since the early 1990s the electorate saw 
problems related to minorities and refugees very important societal issues. As figure 3 
indicates, these issues suddenly became more important for many voters at the turn of 
the 1990s, while, most notably, unemployment became much less of a salient issue. Also 
in view of the good economic record of the Purple government, the success of Fortuyn 
was thus not so much related to socio-economic conditions (Van Holsteyn & Irwin, 
2003).      
 
*** FIGURE 3 HERE *** 
 
As Aarts and Thomassen argue, none of the established political parties prioritised 
these newly emerged issues in their political programme in 2002. Furthermore, the 
perceived positions of the Christian Democrats and especially the Labour Party towards 
ethnic minorities and asylum seekers were quite different from the attitudes of the 
electorate. Similarly, Van Holsteyn, Irwin and Den Ridder (2003) argue that it was not so 
much the electorate that shifted to the ‘right’ at the 2002 general elections; the public 
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merely reacted to the entrance of a credible newcomer which tapped into their pre-
existing attitudes. 
The rise of Pim Fortuyn can thus be seen as the result of the perception among a 
considerable share of the electorate that the mainstream political parties did not 
sufficiently take into account salient social issues. A vote for Fortuyn was not merely a 
protest vote driven by political apathy or cynicism (Van der Brug, 2003), even though 
attitudes of discontent are also likely to have contributed to the support of Fortuyn 
(Bélanger & Aarts, 2006). Judging from figure 4, LPF voters indeed seemed driven by the 
substance of Fortuyn’s programme, but the LPF vote was also largely propelled by 
dissatisfaction with the Purple government or a feeling that Dutch politics needed to be 
shaken up.  
 
*** FIGURE 4 HERE *** 
 
Even if the mainstream parties adapted their positions after the elections of 2002, 
they do not seem to have regained the confidence of a considerable share of the 
dissatisfied electorate. The lack of confidence in politicians particularly shows when the 
opinions of Freedom Party voters are considered. According to data from the Dutch 
Parliamentary Election Study from 2006, roughly two-thirds of Wilders’ electorate agreed 
with the statement that ‘MPs do not care about opinions of people like me’, whereas 
about one-third of the non-Freedom Party voters agreed with this (see figure 5).  
 
*** FIGURE 5 HERE *** 
 
In attempting to reap from this public dissatisfaction Wilders seemed to have 
made a sensible choice in writing a more left-wing manifesto in terms of socio-economic 
issues. As Van der Brug and Van Spanje (2009) have argued, in Western Europe there is 
a substantial group of people who are left-leaning on socio-economic policies and right-
leaning on immigration. Like in most other countries, in the Netherlands there was no 
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party truly representing this group of voters in recent years. It seemed thus logical for 
Wilders to include various more left-leaning proposals in his 2010 programme as, for, 
instance the Danish People’s Party has done before. Indeed, a post-election survey of 
research institute Synovate (2010) suggests that the Freedom Party managed to win 
over many former, presumably ‘left-wing’, Labour and Socialist Party supporters. Also 
many former Liberal, Christian Democrat and non-voters cast their ballot on Wilders in 
2010, however, indicating that Wilders truly had become a ‘catch-all populist’.      
Yet, if the breeding ground for populism has been present all along, how can the 
failure of other populist parties and the electorate’s return to the established parties in 
2003 be explained? To account for this, the agency of the populist parties themselves 
has to be considered.    
 
Supply of credible populist parties 
Even if the breeding ground for populism has been present in the Netherlands, there 
would have been no populist success without the supply of a credible populist political 
party; a party marked by skilful leadership and a decent party organisation (Carter, 
2005). Pim Fortuyn’s popularity, and the success of populist leaders in general, is often 
related to personal ‘charisma’ (e.g. Ellemers, 2004). However, this ‘charisma hypothesis’, 
based on the notion that a vote for a populist party is largely motivated by the 
extraordinary endowments of the populist leader alone, has been rightly criticised (Van 
der Brug, 2003; Van der Brug & Mughan, 2007). Indeed, as has been shown above, 
people voting for populist parties seem to be motivated by substantive concerns, just 
like supporters of any other parties.  
This is not to say that party leaders, especially of populist parties, do not play an 
important role. On the basis of the 2006 Dutch Parliamentary Election Study, Van 
Holsteyn and Andeweg (2008) show that a mere 8% of all respondents answered that 
they would follow the leader of the party they preferred if he or she would switch to 
another party. With regard to supporters of the Freedom Party, a party so clearly centred 
around Wilders, this figure was 25%. Furthermore, in the election campaign of 2002 the 
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importance of the leadership factor was evident; the support for ‘Liveable Netherlands’ in 
the polls only truly began to rise under Pim Fortuyn’s leadership. After the forced 
departure of Fortuyn in February 2002 it became even clearer that it was the appeal of 
Fortuyn that really mattered; most Liveable supporters followed him to his new party.  
 In the pre-Fortuyn era populist parties could not rely on such an extraordinary 
figurehead. The populist anti-immigrant Centre Party and Centre Democrats, led by the 
late Hans Janmaat, only had some very limited success in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Between 1994 and 1998 the Centre Democrats reached their peak with 3 seats, before 
disappearing from parliament in 1998. Janmaat was hardly an appealing leader. Whilst 
being a confident speaker, he was “not really eloquent and often too emotional to 
convince anyone but his own supporters” (Lucardie, 1998: 116). Besides, in terms of 
organisation, both Janmaat’s parties were not free from internal disputes. Janmaat was 
actually expelled from the Centre Party in 1984 and founded the Centre Democrats 
afterwards. Finally, as figure 3 has shown, immigration only really became a salient issue 
in the 1990s. During most of this decade Liberal leader Bolkestein managed to effectively 
voice discontent as regards the, allegedly too liberal, Dutch migration policy (Lucardie, 
1998: 122). This is likely to have reduced the appeal of the Centre Democrats even 
further.    
     The Socialist Party, in turn, lacked sufficient nationwide visibility until the late 
1990s (Van der Steen, 1995; Voerman & Lucardie, 2007). After the disappointing 1989 
general election the party broadened the scope of its campaign efforts and the party 
became known for its telling campaign slogan ‘Vote against, vote SP!’ (Stem tegen, stem 
SP!). The Labour party, meanwhile, received criticism for the cuts in social benefits 
during its time in office. In 1994 the SP managed to win two seats and grew further in 
1998, receiving five seats. Jan Marijnissen grew out to be an appealing, eloquent leader 
and the party remained well organised.  
However, in order to appeal to a wider audience the party let go of its more 
radical policies and dropped references to its communist heritage (Voerman & Lucardie, 
2007). Moreover, as discussed previously, also its populist rhetoric waned. In 2002 the 
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party’s slogan, for instance, had remarkably changed in ‘Vote for, vote SP’ (Stem voor, 
stem SP!). The party now presented itself as a more leftist alternative to Labour, rather 
than a pure populist anti-establishment party. This also shows in the motivations of its 
electorate. According to Dutch Parliamentary Election Study data only 2.6% of the 
Socialist Party voting respondents gave ‘to shake up the Netherlands, change or 
dissatisfaction with the Purple Cabinet’ as a reason as to why they voted for the party in 
2002 (Irwin et al., 2003). This compares to a figure of no less than 31.5% for LPF voting 
respondents (see figure 4). 
  Compared to the SP, Pim Fortuyn clearly needed less time to put his party in the 
spotlights. He dominated the campaign of 2002 and was also by far the most visible 
politician in the media (Kleinnijenhuis et al, 2003). With his effective performance he 
placed the established parties in a difficult position. The most notable occasion where 
this happened was the TV debate following the municipal elections in March. The 
broadcast showed the grumpy looking Labour and Liberal party leaders being unable, 
and seemingly unwilling, to respond to the triumphant monologues of Pim Fortuyn.  
Fortuyn’s dominance in the campaign does not necessarily say something about 
his popularity. Koopmans and Muis (2009) do find, however, that the public visibility of 
Fortuyn combined with the support from other actors in the public sphere proved to be 
beneficial for Fortuyn’s support in the pre-electoral opinion polls. Van Holsteyn and Irwin 
(2003) further show that although Fortuyn was clearly perceived as the least 
sympathetic party leader on the whole, a large share of the voters that did evaluate 
Fortuyn favourably also cast a vote for him. Whereas Fortuyn and his ideas were thus 
highly controversial, he was nevertheless seen as the right candidate by a substantial 
part of the electorate.  
Once represented in parliament and government, however, Fortuyn’s party failed 
to leave a good impression. This related, above all, to the organisational weakness of the 
party after Fortuyn’s assassination. Directly after Fortuyn had been murdered, the 
internal turmoil began and the struggles continued after the List Pim Fortuyn became 
part of the governing coalition. It was without doubt the continuous infighting between 
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LPF cabinet members – most notably the ministers Heinsbroek and Bomhoff - MPs and 
party officials that caused the breakdown of the government. Without Pim Fortuyn, the 
party organisation of the LPF proved to be no more than loose sand. In the words of 
former party leader Mat Herben: “Not one organisation is able to function without 
(accepted) leadership, loyalty and discipline. After Pim Fortuyn had gone there was a 
lack of all three within the LPF” (Herben, 2005, pp. 25).  
The results of the 2003 general elections seemed to indicate a return to ‘old’ 
politics. The fact that the LPF, despite the enormous organisational chaos, still managed 
gather 5.7% of the vote showed that a substantial amount of voters was reluctant to 
return to the mainstream parties, however. Besides, no other serious populist contender 
with similar ideas to Fortuyn participated in the 2003 general elections. Liveable 
Netherlands was torn by leadership struggles; it was strikingly the inexperienced and 
unknown younger sister of former Fortuyn spin-doctor Kay van der Linde who eventually 
became the party leader. The person who missed out on LN leadership, the well known 
‘motivation trainer’ Emile Ratelband, competed with his own list, but seemed too much 
of a controversial and, different to Fortuyn, incapable candidate2. Neither Liveable, nor 
Ratelband received enough votes to become represented in parliament. With her new 
party Winny de Jong, former List Pim Fortuyn MP, also stood for the elections, but she 
lacked media attention, and she was too much associated with the LPF skirmishes to 
secure seats. 
In 2006 the situation was different; several right-wing populist candidates 
emerged with a certain political track record. Former List Pim Fortuyn immigration 
minister Hilbrand Nawijn formed the Party for the Netherlands (PVN) and Marco Pastors, 
former alderman for Fortuyn’s local party Liveable Rotterdam, and Joost Eerdmans, who 
had been a prominent List Pim Fortuyn MP, formed One NL (EénNL). Finally, List 5 
Fortuyn more or less emerged out of the original LPF, although its leader Olaf Stuger was 
by far the most unknown party leader of the newly emerged populist parties and the 
party’s campaign appeared to be quite poor 3 . It was Geert Wilders, however, who 
managed to collect most of the populist votes.   
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Having learned from the mistakes of the List Pim Fortuyn, Wilders managed to 
keep the ranks within the party closed after the election. Wilders was very clear about 
wanting to avoid ‘LPF-like situations’ when deciding to only stand in two municipalities in 
the local election in March 2010, due to the lack of qualified candidates. At the same 
time, his popularity grew steadily and he received ample media attention with strong 
statements and, in particular, with his controversial anti-Islam film Fitna from 2008 
(Vossen, 2010). Even though immigration and Islam was not the prime issue of the 
election campaign of 2010, Wilders still managed to make a strong appearance in TV 
debates and to present himself as the saviour of the economic interests of ordinary hard 
working men and women (Van Kessel, 2010). A first crack in the party organisation 
appeared to materialise when Freedom Party MP Hero Brinkman openly dissented with 
the opinion of Wilders related to terms of government participation. Wilders, however, 
reacted calmly in his public appearance the next day and effectively managed to hush 
the rumour.     
The other right-wing populist who stood in the 2010 general election, Rita 
Verdonk, was a much less powerful contender. Although polls indicated that she could 
rely on a substantial amount of support just after the launch of her movement Proud of 
the Netherlands (Vossen 2010), Verdonk struggled to retain media attention in the 
following years. Also during the 2010 campaign she hardly played a visible role. Unlike 
Wilders, she was not invited to the debates involving the supposed main contenders of 
the election. Also in organisational terms, Verdonk failed to leave a good impression. In 
2008 she had to break with two of her closest trustees: Kay Verlinden – after his 
negative remarks about the party leaked out – and Ed Sinke – after a vicious personal 
conflict. 
The Freedom party of Geert Wilders, in contrast, agreed to support a minority 
government. This situation appears to be very advantageous for him. Through the 
support agreement he is able to influence government policy, but he can still blame the 
government – in which his party is not officially taking part – for taking less popular 
measures. In this way, Wilders might be able to continue to voice a credible anti-
22 
 
establishment message.     
Whether Wilders is able to keep his party organised, however, is a different 
question. As early as November 2010, the Dutch media widely reported about the 
missteps various Freedom Party MPs have made in the past. The most prominent scandal 
involved MP Eric Lucassen who, apart from allegedly howling unwelcome remarks at 
neighbours, was convicted during his time in the army for engaging in sexual activities 
with lower-ranked personnel. Despite this, Lucassen remained seated in parliament for 
the Freedom Party. At the time of writing, there are no signs of these affairs having a 
negative effect on the popularity of Geert Wilders’ party. If incidents like these will 
continue in the future, however, it remains to be seen whether Wilders can fend off ‘LPF-
like situations’.         
    
Conclusions and implications 
This contribution has sought to outline key causal conditions related to the electoral 
performance of populist parties, using the Netherlands as a case study. The case of the 
Netherlands can be seen as an ideal ‘laboratory’ case in view of the varying levels of 
success for Dutch populist parties in recent years. This article argued that the 
combination of three causal conditions has been crucial: the availability of the electorate, 
the responsiveness of established parties and the supply of credible populist parties.  
As has been shown, the structures of party competition in the Netherlands have 
become highly favourable to the electoral success of populist parties. The electorate has 
become increasingly available after the demise of the pillarised cleavage structures, 
which meant that, in more recent years, new parties were fully able to profit from the 
highly proportional Dutch electoral system.  
In addition, the agency of political parties played a crucial role. Political 
mainstream parties were widely perceived to be unresponsive to the demands of a 
substantial part of the electorate. The most important issues at stake were immigration 
and cultural integration of minorities. Whereas the party of Pim Fortuyn failed to sustain, 
his populist critique was not silenced and the potential for new populist entrepreneurs 
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remained very much present. In 2006 another populist party entered the Dutch 
Parliament: the Freedom Party of Geert Wilders. This party became the third largest 
party in Dutch Parliament after the general election of 2010 and provides support for the 
minority government that was subsequently formed.    
Finally, whereas the credibility of the List Pim Fortuyn was damaged due to 
continuous infighting and while other populist contenders lacked appeal, Geert Wilders 
managed to build up a united party organisation under his own firm leadership while 
sending out an appealing message to a large share of the Dutch voters. Whether he will 
manage to preserve cohesion and credibility in the future remains to be seen, however. 
The Dutch case suggests that mainstream parties do not automatically win back 
the support they lost to the populists if they become more responsive. In the 
Netherlands, immigration and cultural integration are now important issues to most 
political parties, but this does not seem to hamper Geert Wilders’ success. This suggests 
that if a populist party manages to retain its credibility, it can ward off competition from 
its mainstream rivals.  
What is more, as the Freedom Party is not officially part of the government it 
remains to be seen whether a ‘black-widow effect’ will materialise (Bale 2003). This 
happens when mainstream parties gobble up the electoral support of the radical junior 
coalition partner by copying its policies. The Freedom Party can, instead, claim credit for 
tougher immigration and integration measures, whilst blaming the government for less 
electorally appealing policies. The Danish People’s party, which has incrementally 
extended its support during the past decade, serves as a good example.  
Further research is required to assess the plausibility of the arguments outlined 
here. One of the main points this contribution has attempted to stress, in any case, is 
the importance of populist party agency. This factor should also be taken into account in 
comparative and quantitative studies on the electoral performance of such parties.  
 
Note
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1 All quotes from interviews, party documents and other literature in this section and beyond are 
translated from Dutch into English by the author. 
2 Ratelband, who had become a famous TV personality, did not have any political experience. His 
motivational training methods included loudly exclaiming the catchword ‘Tsjakka’ and convincing 
people to walk over hot coals barefoot.      
3 In order to show how close List 5 Fortuyn allegedly was to the original ideas of Pim Fortuyn, the 
party’s campaign video showed a man - face concealed yet smartly dressed like Fortuyn - being 
parachuted from the skies, landing in the midst of the Dutch parliamentary buildings. The man 
turns out not to be Fortuyn, but Olaf Stuger.        
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Table 1: Dutch general election results 1998-2010.  
Party 1998 2002 2003 2006 2010 
Labour Party (PvdA) 29.0% (45) 15.1% (23) 27.3% (42) 21.2% (33) 19.6% (30) 
Liberals (VVD) 24.7% (38) 15.4% (24) 17.9% (28) 14.6% (22) 20.4% (31) 
Chr. Democrats (CDA) 18.4% (29) 27.9% (43) 28.6% (44) 26.5% (41) 13.7% (21) 
Democrats ’66 (D66) 9.0% (14) 5.1% (7) 4.1% (6) 2.0% (3) 6.9% (10) 
GreenLeft (GL) 7.3% (11) 7.0% (10) 5.1% (8) 4.6% (7) 6.6% (10) 
Socialist Party (SP)  3.5% (5) 5.9% (9) 6.3% (9) 16.6% (25) 9.9% (15) 
Christian Union (CU) 3.2% (5) 2.5% (4) 2.1% (3) 4.0% (6) 3.3% (5) 
List Pim Fortuyn (LPF)  17.0% (26) 5.7% (8) 0.2% (0)  
Liveable NL (LN)  1.6% (2)    
Freedom Party (PVV)    5.9% (9) 15.5% (24) 
Others 4.9% (3) 2.5% (2) 2.9%0(2) 4.4% (4) 4.1% (4) 
Total 100% (150) 100% (150) 100% (150) 100% (150) 100% (150) 
Note: Number between brackets represents number of seats. The percentage for the Christian 
Union (CU) in 1998 is the combined percentage of the GPV and RPF, the parties that later merged 
into the CU. Data from: http://www.parties-and-elections.de/netherlands.html 
 
 
Table 2: Electoral choice according to social background 1956-2002 in percentages. 
 ‘56 ‘68 ‘77 ‘86 ‘98 ‘02 
Practising Catholic voting KVP/CDA  95 72 66 66 53 66 
Practising Dutch Reformed voting ARP, CHU/CDA 63 55 52 58 44 53 
Practising Calvinist voting ARP, CHU/CDA 93 78 75 58 44 43 
Secular working class voting Labour Party (PvdA) 68 65 67 60 51 34 
Secular middle class voting Liberal Party (VVD) 32 25 30 28 31 19 
Total percentage of voters explained with 
the structured model of electoral behaviour 
72 60 54 44 38 28 
Source: Van Holsteyn and Irwin (2003: 50). 
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Figure 1: Aggregate Electoral volatility in the Netherlands 
 
Source: Mair (2008). Figure for 2006-2010 based on own calculations.    
 
 
 
Figure 2: Balance between positive and negative references regarding multiculturalism.           
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Data: Budge et al (2001), Klingemann et al (2006). The multiculturalism references scale is 
computed as: multiculturalism (positive references) minus multiculturalism (negative references).   
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Most important issues as perceived by the Dutch electorate 
 
Source: Aarts and Thomassen (2008: 216). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Reasons behind party choice in general elections of 2002  
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Data: Dutch Parliamentary Election Study 2002-2003 (Irwin et al 2003). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Views with the statement: ‘MPs do not care about opinions of people like me’  
 
Data: Dutch Parliamentary Election Study 2006 (CBS et al 2007). 
 
